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Abstract. We define a new model of communication complexity, called the garden-hose
model. Informally, the garden-hose complexity of a function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
is given by the minimal number of water pipes that need to be shared between two parties,
Alice and Bob, in order for them to compute the function f as follows: Alice connects her
ends of the pipes in a way that is determined solely by her input x ∈ {0, 1}n and, similarly,
Bob connects his ends of the pipes in a way that is determined solely by his input y ∈ {0, 1}n.
Alice turns on the water tap that she also connected to one of the pipes. Then, the water
comes out on Alice’s or Bob’s side depending on the function value f(x, y).
We prove almost-linear lower bounds on the garden-hose complexity for concrete functions
like inner product, majority, and equality, and we show the existence of functions with expo-
nential garden-hose complexity. Furthermore, we show a connection to classical complexity
theory by proving that all functions computable in log-space have polynomial garden-hose
complexity.
We consider a randomized variant of the garden-hose complexity, where Alice and Bob hold
pre-shared randomness, and a quantum variant, where Alice and Bob hold pre-shared quan-
tum entanglement, and we show that the randomized garden-hose complexity is within a
polynomial factor of the deterministic garden-hose complexity. Examples of (partial) func-
tions are given where the quantum garden-hose complexity is logarithmic in n while the
classical garden-hose complexity can be lower bounded by nc for constant c > 0.
Finally, we show an interesting connection between the garden-hose model and the (in)security
of a certain class of quantum position-verification schemes.
1 Introduction
The garden-hose model On a beautiful sunny day, Alice and Bob relax in their neigh-
boring gardens. It happens that their two gardens share s water pipes, labeled by the
numbers 1, 2, . . . , s. Each of these water pipes has one loose end in Alice’s and the other
loose end in Bob’s garden. For the fun of it, Alice and Bob play the following game. Alice
uses pieces of hose to locally connect some of the pipe ends that are in her garden with
each other. For example, she might connect pipe 2 with pipe 5, pipe 4 with pipe 9, etc.
Similarly, Bob locally connects some of the pipe ends that are in his garden; for instance
pipe 1 with pipe 4, etc. We note that no T-pieces (nor more complicated constructions),
which connect two or more pipes to one (or vice versa) are allowed. Finally, Alice connects
a water tap to one of her ends of the pipes, e.g., to pipe 3 and she turns on the tap. Alice
and Bob observe which of the two gardens gets sprinkled. It is easy to see that since Alice
and Bob only use simple one-to-one connections, there is no “deadlock” possible and the
water will indeed eventually come out on one of the two sides. Which side it is obviously
depends on the respective local connections.
Now, say that Alice connects her ends of the pipes (and the tap) not in a fixed way,
but her choice of connections depends on a private bit string x ∈ {0, 1}n; for different
strings x and x′, she may connect her ends of the pipes differently. Similarly, Bob’s choice
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which pipes to connect depends on a private bit string y ∈ {0, 1}n. These strategies then
specify a function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} as follows: f(x, y) is defined to be 0 if,
using the connections determined by x and y respectively, the water ends up on Alice’s
side, and f(x, y) is 1 if the water ends up on Bob’s side.
Switching the point of view, we can now take an arbitrary Boolean function f :
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and ask: How can f be computed in the garden-hose model?
How do Alice and Bob have to choose their local connections, and how many water pipes
are necessary for computing f in the garden-hose model? We stress that Alice’s choice for
which pipes to connect may only depend on x but not on y, and vice versa; this is what
makes the above questions non-trivial.
In this paper, we introduce and put forward the notion of garden-hose complexity.
For a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}, the garden-hose complexity GH (f)
of f is defined to be the minimal number s of water pipes needed to compute f in the
garden-hose model. It is not too hard to see that GH (f) is well defined (and finite) for
any function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}.
This new complexity notion opens up a large spectrum of natural problems and ques-
tions. What is the (asymptotic or exact) garden-hose complexity of natural functions, like
equality, inner product etc.? How hard is it to compute the garden-hose complexity in
general? How is the garden-hose complexity related to other complexity measures? What
is the impact of randomness, or entanglement? Some of these questions we answer in this
work; others remain open.
Lower and upper bounds We show a near-linear Ω(n/ log(n)) lower bound on the
garden-hose complexity GH (f) for a natural class of functions f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}. This class of functions includes the mod-2 inner-product function, the equality
function, and the majority function. For the former two, this bound is rather tight, in
that for these two functions we also show a linear upper bound. For the majority function,
the best upper bound we know is quadratic. Recently, Margalit and Matsliah improved
our upper bound for the equality function with the help of the IBM SAT-Solver [MM12]
to approximately 1.448n, and the question of how many water pipes are necessary to
compute the equality function in the garden-hose model featured as April 2012’s “Ponder
This” puzzle on the IBM website3. The exact garden-hose complexity of the equality
function is still unknown, though; let alone of other functions.
By using a counting argument, we show the existence of functions with exponential
garden-hose complexity, but so far, no such function is known explicitly.
Connections to other complexity notions We show that every function f : {0, 1}n×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1} that is log-space computable has polynomial garden-hose complexity. And,
vice versa, we show that every function with polynomial garden-hose complexity is, up to
local pre-processing, log-space computable. As a consequence, we obtain that the set of
functions with polynomial garden-hose complexity is exactly given by the functions that
can be computed by arbitrary local pre-processing followed by a log-space computation.
We also point out a connection to communication complexity by observing that, for
any function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, the one-way communication complexity of f
is a lower bound on GH (f) log(GH (f)).
3 http://ibm.co/I7yvMz
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Randomized and quantum garden-hose complexity We consider the following
natural variants of the garden-hose model. In the randomized garden-hose model, Alice
and Bob additionally share a uniformly random string r, and the water is allowed to
come out on the wrong side with small probability ε. Similarly, in the quantum garden-
hose model, Alice and Bob additionally hold an arbitrary entangled quantum state and
their wiring strategies can depend on the outcomes of measuring this state before playing
the garden-hose game. Again, the water is allowed to come out on the wrong side with
small probability ε. Based on the observed connections of the garden-hose complexity to
log-space computation and to one-way communication complexity, we can show that the
resulting notion of randomized garden-hose complexity GHε(f) is polynomially related
to GH (f). For the resulting notion of quantum garden-hose complexity GHQε (f), we can
show a separation (for a partial function) from GHε(f).
Application to quantum position-verification Finally, we show an interesting con-
nection between the garden-hose model and the (in)security of a certain class of quantum
position-verification schemes. The goal of position-verification is to verify the geographical
position pos of a prover P by means of sending messages to P and measuring the time
it takes P to reply. Position-verification with security against collusion attacks, where
different attacking parties collaborate in order to try to fool the verifiers, was shown to be
impossible in the classical setting by [CGMO09], and in the quantum setting by [BCF+11],
if there is no restriction put upon the attackers. In the quantum setting, this raises the
question whether there exist schemes that are secure in case the attackers’ quantum ca-
pabilities are limited.
We consider a simple and natural class of quantum position-verification schemes; each
scheme PVfqubit in the class is specified by a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}. These schemes may have the desirable property that the more classical resources
the honest users use to faithfully execute the scheme, the more quantum resources the
adversary needs in order to break it. It turns out that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the garden-hose game and a certain class of attacks on these schemes, where the
attackers teleport a qubit back and forth using a supply of EPR pairs. As an immediate
consequence, the (quantum) garden-hose complexity of f gives an upper bound on the
number of EPR pairs the attackers need in order to break the scheme PVfqubit. As a
corollary, we obtain the following interesting connection between proving the security of
quantum protocols and classical complexity theory: If there is an f in P such that there
is no way of attacking scheme PVfqubit using a polynomial number of EPR pairs, then
P 6= L. Vice versa, our approach may lead to practical secure quantum position-verification
schemes whose security is based on classical complexity-theoretical assumptions such as P
is different from L. However, so far it is still unclear whether the garden-hose complexity
by any means gives a lower bound on the number of EPR pairs needed; this remains to
be further investigated.
2 The Garden-Hose Model
2.1 Definition
Alice and Bob get n-bit input strings x and y, respectively. Their goal is to “compute”
an agreed-upon Boolean function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} on these inputs, in the
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following way. Alice and Bob have s water pipes between them, and, depending on their
respective classical inputs x and y, they connect (some of) their ends of the pipes with
pieces of hose. Additionally, Alice connects a water tap to one of the pipes. They succeed
in computing f in the garden-hose model, if the water comes out on Alice’s side whenever
f(x, y) = 0, and the water comes out on Bob’s side whenever f(x, y) = 1. Note that it
does not matter out of which pipe the water flows, only on which side it flows. What
makes the game non-trivial is that Alice and Bob must do their “plumbing” based on
their local input only, and they are not allowed to communicate. We refer to Figure 1 for
an illustration of computing the XOR function in the garden-hose model.
0
1
x = 0 x = 1
Alice
y = 0 y = 1
Bob
XOR
Source
Fig. 1. Computing the XOR function in the garden-hose model using three water pipes. If Alice’s input
bit x is 0, she connects the water tap to the first water pipe labeled “0”. In case x = 1, she connects the
tap to the second pipe labeled “1”.
We formalize the above description of the garden-hose game, given in terms of pipes
and hoses etc., by means of rigorous graph-theoretic terminology. However, we feel that
the above terminology captures the notion of a garden-hose game very well, and thus we
sometimes use the above “watery” terminology. We start with a balanced bi-partite graph
(A∪B,E) which is 1-regular and where the cardinality of A and B is |A| = |B| = s, for an
arbitrary large s ∈ N. We slightly abuse notation and denote both the vertices in A and in
B by the integers 1, . . . , s. If we need to distinguish i ∈ A from i ∈ B, we use the notation
iA and iB. We may assume that E consists of the edges that connect i ∈ A with i ∈ B
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , s}, i.e., E = {{iA, iB} : 1 ≤ i ≤ s}. These edges in E are the pipes
in the above terminology. We now extend the graph to (A◦ ∪B,E) by adding a vertex 0
to A, resulting in A◦ = A ∪ {0}. This vertex corresponds to the water tap, which Alice
can connect to one of the pipes. Given a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1},
consider two functions EA◦ and EB; both take as input a string in {0, 1}n and output a set
of edges (without self loops). For any x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, EA◦(x) is a set of edges on the vertices
A◦ and EB(x) is a set of edges on the vertices B, so that the resulting graphs (A◦, EA◦(x))
and (B,EB(y)) have maximum degree at most 1. EA◦(x) consists of the connections among
the pipes (and the tap) on Alice’s side (on input x), and correspondingly for EB(y). For
any x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, we define the graph G(x, y) = (A◦∪B,E ∪EA◦(x)∪EB(y)) by adding
the edges EA◦(x) and EB(y) to E. G(x, y) consists of the pipes with the connections
added by Alice and Bob. Note that the vertex 0 ∈ A◦ has degree at most 1, and the graph
G(x, y) has maximum degree at most two 2; it follows that the maximal path pi(x, y)
that starts at the vertex 0 ∈ A◦ is uniquely determined. pi(x, y) represents the flow of the
water, and the endpoint of pi(x, y) determines whether the water comes out on Alice or
on Bob’s side (depending on whether the final vertex is in A◦ or in B).
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Definition 2.1. A garden-hose game is given by a graph function G : (x, y) 7→ G(x, y) as
described above. The number of pipes s is called the size of G, and is denoted as s(G). A
garden-hose game G is said to compute a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
if the endpoint of the maximal path pi(x, y) starting at 0 is in A◦ whenever f(x, y) = 0
and in B whenever f(x, y) = 1.
Definition 2.2. The deterministic garden-hose complexity of a Boolean function f :
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is the size s(G) of the smallest garden-hose game G that com-
putes f . We denote it by GH (f).
2.2 Upper and Lower Bounds
In this section, we present upper and lower bounds on the number of pipes required to
compute some particular (classes of) functions in the garden-hose model. We first give
a simple upper bound on GH (f) which is implicitly proven in the attack on Scheme II
in [KMS11].
Proposition 2.3. For every Boolean function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, the garden-
hose complexity GH (f) is at most 2n + 1.
Proof. We identify {0, 1}n with {1, . . . , 2n} in the natural way. For s = 2n + 1 and the
resulting bipartite graph (A◦ ∪B,E), we can define EA◦ and EB as follows. EA◦(x) is set
to {(0, x)}, meaning that Alice connects the tap with the pipe labeled by her input x. To
define EB, group the set Z(y) = {a ∈ {0, 1}n : f(a, y) = 0} arbitrarily into disjoint pairs
{a1, a2} ∪ {a3, a4} ∪ . . . ∪ {a`−1, a`} and set EB(y) = {{a1, a2} , {a3, a4} , . . . , {a`−1, a`}}.
If ` = |Z(y)| is odd so that the decomposition into pairs results in a left-over {a`}, then
a` is connected with the “reserve” pipe labeled by 2
n + 1.
By construction, if x ∈ Z(y) then x = ai for some i, and thus pipe x = ai is connected
on Bob’s side with pipe ai−1 or ai+1, depending on the parity of i, or with the “reserve”
pipe, and thus pi(x, y) is of the form pi(x, y) = (0, xA, xB, vB, vA), ending in A◦. On the
other hand, if x 6∈ Z(y), then pipe x is not connected on Bob’s side, and thus pi(x, y) =
(0, xA, xB), ending in B. This proves the claim. uunionsq
We notice that we can extend this proof to show that the garden-hose complexity GH (f)
is at most 2D(f)+1 − 1, where D(f) is the deterministic communication complexity of f .
See Appendix A for a sketch of the method.
Definition 2.4. We call a function f injective for Alice, if for every two different inputs
x and x′ there exists y such that f(x, y) 6= f(x′, y). We define injective for Bob in an
analogous way: for every y 6= y′, there exists x such that f(x, y) 6= f(x, y′) holds.
Proposition 2.5. If f is injective for Bob or f is injective for Alice, then4
GH (f) log(GH (f)) ≥ n .
Proof. We give the proof when f is injective for Bob. The proof for the case where f is
injective for Alice is the same. Consider a garden-hose game G that computes f . Let s
4 All logarithms in this paper are with respect to base 2.
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be its size s(G). Since, on Bob’s side, every pipe is connected to at most one other pipe,
there are at most ss = 2s log(s) possible choices for EB(y), i.e., the set of connections on
Bob’s side. Thus, if 2s log(s) < 2n, it follows from the pigeonhole principle that there must
exist y and y′ in {0, 1}n for which EB(y) = EB(y′), and thus for which G(x, y) = G(x, y′)
for all x ∈ {0, 1}n. But this cannot be since G computes f and f(x, y) 6= f(x, y′) for some
x due to the injectivity for Bob. Thus, 2s log(s) ≥ 2n which implies the claim. uunionsq
We can use this result to obtain an almost linear lower bound for several functions
that are often studied in communication complexity settings such as:
– Bitwise inner product: IP(x, y) =
∑
i xiyi (mod 2)
– Equality: EQ(x, y) = 1 if and only if x = y
– Majority: MAJ(x, y) = 1 if and only if
∑
i xiyi ≥ dn2 e
The first two of these functions are injective for both Alice and Bob, while majority is
injective for inputs of Hamming weight at least n/2, giving us the following corollary.
Corollary 2.6. The functions bitwise inner product, equality and majority have garden-
hose complexity in Ω( nlog(n)).
By considering the water pipes that actually get wet, one can show a lower bound of n
pipes for equality [Pie11]. On the other hand, we can show upper bounds that are linear
for the bitwise inner product and equality, and quadratic in case of majority. We refer
to [Spe11] for the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 2.7. In the garden-hose model, the equality function can be computed with
3n+ 1 pipes, the bitwise inner product with 4n+ 1 pipes and majority with (n+ 2)2 pipes.
In general, garden-hose protocols can be transformed into (one-way) communication
protocols by Alice sending her connections EA◦(x) to receiver Bob, which will require
at most GH (f) log(GH (f)) bits of communication. Bob can then locally compute the
function by combining Alice’s message with EB(y) and checking where the water exits.
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We summarize this observation in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.8. Let D1(f) denote the deterministic one-way communication complex-
ity of f . Then,
D1(f) ≤ GH (f) log(GH (f)) .
As a consequence, lower bounds on the communication complexity carry over to the
garden-hose complexity (up to logarithmic factors). Notice that this technique will never
give lower bounds that are better than linear, as problem in communication complexity
can always be solved by sending the entire input to the other party. It is an interesting
open problem to show super-linear lower bounds in the garden-hose model, e.g. for the
majority function.
Proposition 2.9.
There exist functions f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} for which GH (f) is exponential.
5 In fact, garden-hose protocols can even be transformed into communication protocols in the more
restrictive simultaneous-message-passage model, where Alice and Bob send simultaneous messages con-
sisting of their connections EA◦(x) and EB(y) to the referee who then computes the function. The
according statements of Propositions 2.8, 2.19 and 2.20 can be derived analogously.
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Proof. The existence of functions with an exponential garden-hose complexity can be
shown by a simple counting argument. There are 22
2n
different functions f(x, y). For
a given size s = s(G) of G, for every x ∈ {0, 1}n, there are at most (s + 1)s+1 ways to
choose the connections EA◦(x) on Alice’s side, and thus there are at most ((s+1)
s+1)2
n
=
22
n(s+1) log(s+1) ways to choose the function EA◦ . Similarly for EB, there are at most
22
ns log(s) ways to choose EB. Thus, there are at most 2
2·2n(s+1) log(s+1) ways to choose G
of size s. Clearly, in order for every function f to have a G of size s that computes it, we
need that 2 · 2n(s + 1) log(s + 1) ≥ 22n, and thus that (s + 1) log(s + 1) ≥ 2n−1, which
means that s must be exponential. uunionsq
2.3 Polynomial Garden-Hose Complexity and Log-Space Computations
A family of Boolean functions {fn}n∈N is log-space computable if there exists a determin-
istic Turing machine M and a constant c, such that for any n-bit input x, M outputs the
correct output bit fn(x), and at most c · log n locations of M ’s work tapes are ever visited
by M ’s head during computation.
Definition 2.10. We define L(2), called logarithmic space with local pre-processing, to
be the class of Boolean functions f(x, y) for which there exists a Turing machine M and
two arbitrary functions α(x), β(y), such that6 M(α(x), β(y)) = f(x, y) and M(α(x), β(y))
runs in space logarithmic in the size of the original inputs |x|+ |y|.
This definition can be extended in a natural way by considering Turing machines
and circuits corresponding to various complexity classes, and by varying the number of
players. For example, a construction as in Proposition 2.3 and a similar reasoning as in
Proposition 2.14 below can be used to show that every Boolean function is contained in
PSPACE(2). As main result of this section, we show that our newly defined class L(2) is
equivalent to functions with polynomial garden-hose complexity. We leave it for future
research to study intermediate classes such as AC0(2) which are related to the polynomial
hierarchy of communication complexity [BFS86].
Theorem 2.11. The set of functions f with polynomial garden-hose complexity GH (f)
is equal to L(2).
The two directions of the theorem follow from Theorem 2.12 and Proposition 2.14.
Theorem 2.12. If f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is log-space computable, then GH (f) is
polynomial in n.
Proof (sketch, full proof in Appendix B.1).
Let M be the deterministic log-space Turing machine deciding f(x, y) = 0. Using tech-
niques from [LMT97], M can be made reversible incurring only a constant loss in space.
As M is a log-space machine, it has at most polynomially many configurations. The idea
for the garden-hose strategy is to label the pipes with those configurations of the machine
M where the input head of M “switches sides” from the x-part of the input to the y-part
6 For simplicity of notation, we give two arguments to the Turing machine whose concatenation is inter-
preted as the input.
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or vice versa. Thanks to the reversibility of M , the players can then use one-to-one con-
nections to wire up (depending on their individual inputs) the open ends of the pipes on
their side, so that eventually the water flow corresponds to M ’s computation of f(x, y).
uunionsq
In the garden-hose model, we allow Alice and Bob to locally pre-process their inputs
before computing their wiring. Therefore, it immediately follows from Theorem 2.12 that
any function f in L(2) has polynomial garden-hose complexity, proving one direction of
Theorem 2.11.
We saw in Proposition 2.9 that there exist functions with large garden-hose complex-
ity. However, a negative implication of Theorem 2.12 is that proving the existence of
a polynomial-time computable function f with exponential garden-hose complexity is at
least as hard as separating L from P, a long-standing open problem in complexity theory.
Corollary 2.13. If there exists a function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} in P that has
super-polynomial garden-hose complexity, then P 6= L.
It remains to prove the other inclusion of Theorem 2.11.
Proposition 2.14. Let f : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function. If GH (f) is
polynomial (in n), then f is in L(2).
Proof. Let G be the garden-hose game that achieves s(G) = GH (f). We write s for s(G),
the number of pipes, and we let EA◦ and EB be the underlying edge-picking functions,
which on input x and y, respectively, output the connections that Alice and Bob apply
to the pipes. Note that by assumption, s is polynomial. Furthermore, by the restrictions
on EA◦ and EB, on any input, they consist of at most (s+ 1)/2 connections.
We need to show that f is of the form f(x, y) = g(α(x), β(y)), where α and β are arbi-
trary functions {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, g : {0, 1}m×{0, 1}m → {0, 1} is log-space computable,
and m is polynomial in n. We define α and β as follows. For any x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, α(x)
is simply a natural encoding of EA◦(x) into {0, 1}m, and β(y) is a natural encoding of
EB(y) into {0, 1}m. In the hose-terminology we say that α(x) is a binary encoding of the
connections of Alice, and β(y) is a binary encoding of the connections of Bob. Obviously,
these encodings can be done with m of polynomial size. Given these encodings, finding
the endpoint of the maximum path pi(x, y) starting in 0 can be done with logarithmic
space: at any point during the computation, the Turing machine only needs to maintain
a pointer to the position of the water and a binary flag to remember on which side of
the input tape the head is. Thus, the function g that computes g(α(x), β(y)) = f(x, y) is
log-space computable in m and thus also in n. uunionsq
2.4 Randomized Garden-Hose Complexity
It is natural to study the setting where Alice and Bob share a common random string
and are allowed to err with some probability ε. More formally, we let the players’ local
strategies EA◦(x, r) and EB(y, r) depend on the shared randomness r and write Gr(x, y) =
f(x, y) if the resulting garden-hose game Gr(x, y) computes f(x, y).
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Definition 2.15. Let r be the shared random string. The randomized garden-hose com-
plexity of a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1} is the size s(Gr) of the smallest
garden-hose game Gr such that ∀x, y : Prr[Gr(x, y) = f(x, y)] ≥ 1 − ε. We denote this
minimal size by GHε(f).
In Appendix B.2, we show that the error probability can be made exponentially small
by repeating the protocol a polynomial number of times.
Proposition 2.16. Let f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a function such that GHε(f) is
polynomial in n, with error ε ≤ 12 − n−c for a constant c > 0. For every constant d > 0
there exists a polynomial q(·) such that GH
2−nd (f) ≤ q
(
GHε(f)
)
.
Using this result, any randomized strategy can be turned into a deterministic strategy
with only a polynomial overhead in the number of pipes.
Proposition 2.17. Let f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a function such that GHε(f) is
polynomial in n and ε ≤ 12 − nc for a constant c > 0. Then there exists a polynomial q(·)
such that GH (f) ≤ q(GHε(f)).
Proof (sketch). By Proposition 2.16 there exists a randomized garden-hose protocolGr(x, y)
of size q(GHε(f)) with error probability at most 2
−2n−1. The probability for a random
string r to be wrong for all inputs is at most 22n · 2−2n−1 < 1. In particular, there exists
a string rˆ which works for every input (x, y). uunionsq
Using this Proposition 2.17, we conclude that the lower bound from Proposition 2.9
carries over to the randomized setting.
Corollary 2.18.
There exist functions f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} for which GHε(f) is exponential.
With the same reasoning as in Proposition 2.8, we get that lower bounds on the
randomized one-way communication complexity with public shared randomness carry
over to the randomized garden-hose complexity (up to a logarithmic factor).
Proposition 2.19. Let R1,pubε (f) denote the minimum communication cost of a one-way-
communication protocol which computes f with an error ε using public shared randomness.
Then, R1,pubε (f) ≤ GHε(f) log(GHε(f)).
For instance, the linear lower bound Rpubε (IP ) ∈ Ω(n) from [CG88] for the inner-product
function yields GHε(IP ) ∈ Ω( nlogn).
2.5 Quantum Garden-Hose Complexity
Let us consider the setting where Alice and Bob share an arbitrary entangled quantum
state besides their water pipes. Depending on their respective inputs x and y, they can
perform local quantum measurements on their parts of the entangled state and wire up the
pipes depending on the outcomes of these measurements. We denote the resulting quantum
garden-hose complexity with GHQ(f) in the deterministic case and with GHQε (f) if errors
are allowed.
With the same reasoning as in Proposition 2.8, we get that lower bounds on the
entanglement-assisted one-way communication complexity carry over to the quantum
garden-hose complexity (up to a logarithmic factor).
9
Proposition 2.20. For ε ≥ 0, let Q1ε(f) denote the minimum cost of an entanglement-
assisted one-way communication protocol which computes f with an error ε. Then, Q1ε(f) ≤
GHQε (f) log(GH
Q
ε (f)).
For instance, the lower bound Q1ε(IP ) ∈ Ω(n) which follows from results in [CDNT98]
gives GHQε (IP ) ∈ Ω(n/ log n). For the disjointness function,Q1ε(DISJ) ∈ Ω(
√
n) from [Raz03]
implies GHQε (DISJ) ∈ Ω(√n/ log n).
In Appendix D, we present partial functions which give a separation between the
quantum and classical garden-hose complexity in the deterministic and in the randomized
setting.
Theorem 2.21. There exist partial Boolean functions f and g such that
1. GHQ(f) ∈ O(log n) and GH (f) ∈ Ω( nlogn),
2. GHQε (g) ∈ O(log n) and GHε(g) ∈ Ω(
√
n
logn).
3 Application to Position-Based
Quantum Cryptography
The goal of position-based cryptography is to use the geographical position of a party as
its only “credential”. For example, one would like to send a message to a party at a geo-
graphical position pos with the guarantee that the party can decrypt the message only if
he or she is physically present at pos. The general concept of position-based cryptography
was introduced by Chandran, Goyal, Moriarty and Ostrovsky [CGMO09].
A central task in position-based cryptography is the problem of position-verification.
We have a prover P at position pos, wishing to convince a set of verifiers V0, . . . , Vk (at
different points in geographical space) that P is indeed at that position pos. The prover
can run an interactive protocol with the verifiers in order to convince them. The main
technique for such a protocol is known as distance bounding [BC94]. In this technique, a
verifier sends a random nonce to P and measures the time taken for P to reply back with
this value. Assuming that the speed of communication is bounded by the speed of light,
this technique gives an upper bound on the distance of P from the verifier.
The problem of secure position-verification has been studied before in the field of wire-
less security, and there have been several proposals for this task ([BC94,SSW03,VN04,Bus04]
[CH05,SP05,ZLFW06,CCS06]). However, [CGMO09] shows that there exists no protocol
for secure position-verification that offers security in the presence of multiple colluding
adversaries. In other words, the set of verifiers cannot distinguish between the case when
they are interacting with an honest prover at pos and the case when they are interacting
with multiple colluding dishonest provers, none of which is at position pos.
The impossibility result of [CGMO09] relies heavily on the fact that an adversary can
locally store all information he receives and at the same time share this information with
other colluding adversaries, located elsewhere. Due to the quantum no-cloning theorem,
such a strategy will not work in the quantum setting, which opens the door to secure
protocols that use quantum information. The quantum model was first studied by Kent
et al. under the name of “quantum tagging” [KMSB06,KMS11]. Several schemes were de-
veloped [KMS11,Mal10a,CFG+10,Mal10b,LL11] and proven later to be insecure. Finally
in [BCF+11] it was shown that in general no unconditionally secure quantum position-
verification scheme is possible. Any scheme can be broken using a double exponential
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amount of EPR pairs in the size of the messages of the protocol. Later, Beigi and Ko¨nig
improved in [BK11] the double exponential dependence to single exponential making use
of port-based teleportation [IH08,IH09].
Due to the exponential overhead in EPR pairs, the general no-go theorem does not
rule out the existence of quantum schemes that are secure for all practical purposes. Such
schemes should have the property that the protocol, when followed honestly, is feasible,
but cheating the protocol requires unrealistic amounts of resources, for example EPR
pairs or time.
3.1 A Single-Qubit Scheme
Our original motivation for the garden-hose model was to study a particular quantum pro-
tocol for secure position verification, described in Figure 2. The protocol is of the generic
form described in Section 3.2 of [BCF+11]. In Step 0, the verifiers prepare challenges for
the prover. In Step 1, they send the challenges, timed in such a way that they all arrive at
the same time at the prover. In Step 2, the prover computes his answers and sends them
back to the verifiers. Finally, in Step 3, the verifiers verify the timing and correctness of
the answer.
As in [BCF+11], we consider here for simplicity the case where all players live in one
dimension, the basic ideas generalize to higher dimensions. In one dimension, we can focus
on the case of two verifiers V0, V1 and an honest prover P in between them.
We minimize the amount of quantum communication in that only one verifier, say V0,
sends a qubit to the prover, whereas both verifiers send classical n-bit strings x, y ∈ {0, 1}n
that arrive at the same time at the prover. We fix a publicly known Boolean function
f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} whose output f(x, y) decides whether the prover has to
return the qubit (unchanged) to verifier V0 (in case f(x, y) = 0) or to verifier V1 (if
f(x, y) = 1).
0. V0 randomly chooses two n-bit strings x, y ∈ {0, 1}n and privately sends y to V1. V0 prepares an
EPR pair (|0〉V |0〉P + |1〉V |1〉P )/
√
2. If f(x, y) = 0, V0 keeps the qubit in register V . Otherwise,
V0 sends the qubit in register V privately to V1.
1. V0 sends the qubit in register P to the prover P together with the classical n-bit string x. V1
sends y so that it arrives at the same time as the information from V0 at P .
2. P evaluates f(x, y) ∈ {0, 1} and routes the qubit to Vf(x,y).
3. V0 and V1 accept if the qubit arrives in time at the correct verifier and the Bell measurement of
the received qubit together with the qubit in V yields the correct outcome.
Fig. 2. Position-verification scheme PVfqubit using one qubit and classical n-bit strings.
The motivation for considering this protocol is the following: As the protocol uses only
one qubit which needs to be correctly routed, the honest prover’s quantum actions are
trivial to perform. His main task is evaluating a classical Boolean function f on classical
inputs x and y whose bit size n can be easily scaled up. On the other hand, our results
suggest that the adversary’s job of successfully attacking the protocol becomes harder
and harder for larger input strings x, y.
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3.2 Connection to the Garden-Hose Model
In order to analyze the security of the protocol PVfqubit, we define the following communi-
cation game in which Alice and Bob play the roles of the adversarial attackers of PVfqubit.
Alice starts with an unknown qubit |φ〉 and a classical n-bit string x while Bob holds
the n-bit string y. They also share some quantum state |η〉AB and both players know
the Boolean function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. The players are allowed one round of
simultaneous classical communication combined with arbitrary local quantum operations.
When f(x, y) = 0, Alice should be in possession of the qubit |φ〉 at the end of the protocol
and on f(x, y) = 1, Bob should hold it.
As a simple example consider the case where f(x, y) = x⊕ y, the XOR function, with
1-bit inputs x and y. Alice and Bob then have the following way of performing this task
perfectly by using a pre-shared quantum state consisting of three EPR pairs (three ebits).
Label the first two EPR pairs 0 and 1. Alice teleports7 |φ〉 to Bob using the pair labeled
with her input x. This yields measurement result i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, while Bob teleports his
half of the EPR pair labeled y to Alice using his half of the third EPR pair while obtaining
measurement outcome j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} . In the round of simultaneous communication, both
players send the classical measurement results and their inputs x or y to the other player.
If x ⊕ y = 1, i.e. x and y are different bits, Bob can apply the Pauli operator σi to his
half of the EPR pair labeled x = y⊕ 1, correctly recovering |φ〉. Similarly, if x⊕ y = 0, it
is easy to check that Alice can recover the qubit by applying σiσj to her half of the third
EPR pair.
If Alice and Bob are constrained to the types of actions in the example above, i.e., if
they are restricted to teleporting the quantum state back and forth depending on their
classical inputs, there is a one-to-one correspondence between attacking the position-
verification scheme PVfqubit and computing the function f in the garden-hose model. The
quantum strategy for attacking PVfqubit in the example above exactly corresponds to the
strategy depicted in Figure 1 for computing the XOR-function in the garden-hose model.
More generally, we can translate any strategy of Alice and Bob in the garden-hose
model to a perfect quantum attack of PVfqubit by using one EPR pair per pipe and per-
forming Bell measurements where the players connect the pipes.
Our hope is that also the converse is true: if many pipes are required to compute f (say
we need super-polynomially many), then the number of EPR pairs needed for Alice and
Bob to successfully break PVfqubit with probability close to 1 by means of an arbitrary attack
(not restricted to Bell measurements on EPR pairs) should also be super-polynomial.
The examples of (partial) functions from Theorem 2.21 show that the classical garden-
hose complexity GH (f) does not capture the amount of EPR pairs required to attack
PVfqubit. It is conceivable that one can show that arbitrary attacks can be cast in the
quantum garden-hose model and hence, the quantum garden-hose complexity GHQε (f)
(or a variant of it8) correctly captures the amount of EPR pairs required to attack PVfqubit.
We leave this question as an interesting problem for future research.
We stress that for this application, any polynomial lower bound on the number of
required EPR pairs is already interesting.
7 See Appendix C.1 for a brief introduction to quantum teleportation.
8 In addition to the number of pipes, one might have to account for the size of the entangled state as
well.
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3.3 Lower Bounds on Quantum Resources to Perfectly Attack PVf
qubit
In Appendix E, we show that for a function that is injective for Alice or injective for Bob
(according to Definition 2.4), the dimension of the quantum state the adversaries need
to handle (including possible quantum communication between them) in order to attack
protocol PVfqubit perfectly has to be of order at least linear in the classical input size n. In
other words, they require at least a logarithmic number of qubits in order to successfully
attack PVfqubit.
Theorem 3.1. Let f be injective for Bob. Assume that Alice and Bob perform a per-
fect attack on protocol PVfqubit. Then, the dimension d of the overall state (including the
quantum communication) is in Ω(n).
In the last subsection, we show that there exist functions for which perfect attacks on
PVfqubit requires the adversaries to handle a polynomial amount of qubits.
Theorem 3.2. For any starting state |ψ〉 of dimension d, there exists a Boolean func-
tion f on inputs x, y ∈ {0, 1}n such that any perfect attack on PVfqubit requires d to be
exponential in n.
These results can be seen as first steps towards establishing the desired relation be-
tween classical difficulty of honest actions and quantum difficulty of the actions of dis-
honest players. We leave as future work the generalization of these lower bounds to the
more realistic case of imperfect attacks and also to more relevant quantities like some en-
tanglement measure between the players (instead of the dimension of their shared state).
4 Conclusion and Open Questions
The garden-hose model is a new model of communication complexity. We connected func-
tions with polynomial garden-hose complexity to a newly defined class of log-space com-
putations with local pre-processing. Alternatively, the class L(2) can also be viewed as the
set of functions which can be decided in the simultaneous-message-passing (SMP) model
where the referee is restricted to log-space computations. Many open questions remain.
Can we find better upper and lower bounds for the garden-hose complexity of the studied
functions? The constructions given in [Spe11] still leave a polynomial gap between lower
and upper bounds for many functions. It would also be interesting to find an explicit func-
tion for which the garden-hose complexity is provably super-linear or even exponential,
the counting argument in Proposition 2.9 only shows the existence of such functions. It
is possible to extend the basic garden-hose model in various ways and consider settings
with more than two players, non-Boolean functions or multiple water sources. Further-
more, it is interesting to relate our findings to very recent results about space-bounded
communication complexity [BCP+12].
Garden-hose complexity is a tool for the analysis of a specific scheme for position-based
quantum cryptography. This scheme requires the honest prover to work with only a single
qubit, while the dishonest provers potentially have to manipulate a large quantum state,
making it an appealing scheme to further examine. The garden-hose model captures the
power of attacks that only use teleportation, giving upper bounds for the general scheme,
and lower bounds when restricted to these attacks.
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An interesting additional restriction on the garden-hose model would involve limiting
the computational power of Alice and Bob. For example to polynomial time, or to the
output of quantum circuits of polynomial size. Bounding not only the amount of entan-
glement, but also the amount of computation with a realistic limit might yield stronger
security guarantees for the cryptographic schemes.
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A Upper Bound by Communication Complexity
We show that the garden-hose complexity GH (f) of any function f is at most 2D(f)+1−1,
where D(f) is the deterministic communication complexity of f .
Consider a protocol where Alice and Bob alternate in sending one bit. The pipes
between Alice and Bob are labeled with all possible non-empty strings of length up to
D(f), with one extra reserve pipe.
Let Av(x) be the bit Alice sends after seeing transcript v ∈ {0, 1}∗ given input x
and let Bv(x) be the bit Bob sends after a transcript v on input y. (Since Alice and
Bob alternate, Alice sends a bit on even length transcripts, while Bob sends when the
transcript has odd length.) Alice connects the tap to 0 or 1 depending on the first sent
bit. Then, Alice makes connections
{{v, vAv(x)}|v ∈ {0, 1}∗with |v| even and 1 ≤ |v| ≤ D(f)} .
Here vAv(x) is the concatenation of v and Av(x). Bob’s connections are given by the set
{{v, vBv(x)} |v ∈ {0, 1}∗with |v| odd and 1 ≤ |v| ≤ D(f)} .
Now, for all transcripts of length D(f), Alice knows the function outcome. (Assume D(f)
is even for simplicity.) For those 2D(f) pipes she can route the water to the correct side by
connecting similar outcomes, as in the proof of Proposition 2.3, using one extra reserve
pipe. This brings the total used pipes to 1 +
∑D(f)
i=1 2
i = 2D(f)+1− 1. The correctness can
be verified by comparing the path of the water to the communication protocol: the label
of the pipe the water is in, when following it through the pipes for r “steps”, is exactly
the same as the transcript of the communication protocol when executing it for r rounds.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 2.12
Theorem 2.12 If f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is log-space computable, then GH (f) is
polynomial in n.
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Proof. Let M be a deterministic Turing machine deciding f(x, y) = 0. We assume that
M ’s read-only input tape is of length 2n and contains x on positions 1 to n and y on
positions n+ 1 to 2n. By assumption M uses logarithmic space on its work tapes.
In this proof, a configuration of M is the location of its tape heads, the state of the
Turing machine and the content of its work tapes, excluding the content of the read-only
input tape. This is a slightly different definition than usual, where the content of the input
tape is also part of a configuration. When using the normal definition (which includes the
content of all tapes), we will use the term total configuration. Any configuration of M can
be described using a logarithmic number of bits, because M uses logarithmic space.
A Turing machine is called deterministic, if every total configuration has a unique next
one. A Turing machine is called reversible if in addition to being deterministic, every total
configuration also has a unique predecessor. An S(n) space-bounded deterministic Turing
machine can be simulated by a reversible Turing machine in space O(S(n)) [LMT97].
This means that without loss of generality, we can assume M to be a reversible Turing
machine, which is crucial for our construction. Let M also be oblivious9 in the tape head
movement on the input tape. This can be done with only a small increase in space by
adding a counter.
Alice’s and Bob’s perfect strategies in the garden-hose game are as follows. They
list all configurations where the head of the input tape is on position n coming from
position n + 1. Let us call the set of these configurations CA. Let CB be the analogous
set of configurations where the input tape head is on position n + 1 after having been
on position n the previous step. Because M is oblivious on its input tape, these sets
depend only on the function f , but not on the input pair (x, y). The number of elements
of CA and CB is at most polynomial, being exponential in the description length of the
configurations. Now, for every element in CA and CB, the players label a pipe with this
configuration. Also label |CA| pipes ACCEPT and |CB| of them REJECT. These steps
determine the number of pipes needed, Alice and Bob can do this labeling beforehand.
For every configuration in CA, with corresponding pipe p, Alice runs the Turing ma-
chine starting from that configuration until it either accepts, rejects, or until the input
tape head reaches position n+ 1. If the Turing machine accepts, Alice connects p to the
first free pipe labeled ACCEPT. On a reject, she leaves p unconnected. If the tape head of
the input tape reaches position n+ 1, she connects p to the pipe from CB corresponding
to the configuration of the Turing machine when that happens. By her knowledge of x,
Alice knows the content of the input tape on positions 1 to n, but not the other half.
Alice also runs M from the starting configuration, connecting the water tap to a target
pipe with a configuration from CB depending on the reached configuration.
Bob connects the pipes labeled by CB in an analogous way: He runs the Turing
machine starting with the configuration with which the pipe is labeled until it halts or
the position of the input tape head reaches n. On accepting, the pipe is left unconnected
and if the Turing machine rejects, the pipe is connected to one of the pipes labeled
REJECT. Otherwise, the pipe is connected to the one labeled with the configuration in
CA, the configuration the Turing machine is in when the head on the input tape reached
position n.
9 A Turing machine is called oblivious, if the movement in time of the heads only depend on the length of
the input, known in advance to be 2n, but not on the input itself. For our construction we only require
the input tape head to have this property.
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In the garden-hose game, only one-to-one connections of pipes are allowed. Therefore,
to check that the described strategy is a valid one, the simulations of two different con-
figurations from CA should never reach the same configuration in CB. This is guaranteed
by the reversibility of M as follows. Consider Alice simulating M starting from different
configurations c ∈ CA and c′ ∈ CA. We have to check that their simulation can not end at
the same d ∈ CB, because Alice can not connect both pipes labeled c and c′ to the same d.
Because M is reversible, we can in principle also simulate M backwards in time starting
from a certain configuration. In particular, Alice can simulate M backwards starting with
configuration d, until the input tape head position reaches n+ 1. The configuration of M
at that time can not simultaneously be c and c′, so there will never be two different pipes
trying to connect to the pipe labeled d.
It remains to show that, after the players link up their pipes as described, the water
comes out on Alice’s side if M rejects on input (x, y), and that otherwise the water exits
at Bob’s. We can verify the correctness of the described strategy by comparing the flow of
the water directly to the execution of M . Every pipe the water flows through corresponds
to a configuration of M when it runs starting from the initial state. So the side on which
the water finally exits also corresponds to whether M accepts or rejects. uunionsq
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2.16
Proposition 2.16 Let f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a function such that GHε(f) is
polynomial in n, with error ε ≤ 12 − n−c for a constant c > 0. For every constant d > 0
there exists a polynomial q(·) such that GH
2−nd (f) ≤ q
(
GHε(f)
)
.
Proof. The new protocol G′r(x, y) takes the majority of k = 8n2c+d outcomes of Gri(x, y)
where r1, . . . , rk are k independent and uniform samples of the random string. We have to
establish (i) that taking the majority of k instances of the original protocol indeed gives
the correct outcome with probability at least 1−2−nd and (ii) that G′r(x, y) requires only
polynomial pipes.
(i) Let Xi be the random variable that equals 1 when Gri(x, y) = f(x, y) and 0 other-
wise. Note that the Xi are independent and identically distributed random variables
with expectation E[Xi] ≥ 1 − ε =: p. Whenever
∑k
i=1Xi ≥ k2 the protocol gives the
correct outcome. Use the Chernoff bound to get
Pr
[
k∑
i=1
Xi < (1− ζ)pk
]
≤ e− ζ
2
2
pk
for any small ζ. Picking ζ = n−c, so that (1 − ζ)pk is still greater than k2 , and filling
in k, we can upper bound the probability of failure by
e−
8n2c+d
2n2c
p ≤ 2−nd
(ii) In Theorem 2.12 we show that any log-space computable function can be simulated
by a polynomial-sized garden-hose strategy. Thus, if checking the majority of k garden-
hose strategies can be done in logarithmic space (after local pre-computations by Alice
and Bob), then G′r(x, y) can be computed using a polynomial number of pipes.
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Let Ai = EA◦(x, ri) be the local wiring of Alice for strategy G on input x with random-
ness ri, and let Bi = EB(y, ri). Alice locally generates (A1, . . . , Ak) and Bob locally
generates (B1, . . . , Bk). In the proof of Proposition 2.14 it was shown that simulating
the outcome of a single garden-hose strategy (Ai, Bi) can be done in logarithmic space.
Here we follow the same construction, but instead of getting the outcome of a single
strategy we simulate all k strategies. This can still be done in logarithmic space, since
we can re-use the memory needed to simulate each of the k strategies. To find the
majority, we need to add a counter to keep track of the simulation outcomes, using
only an extra log k bits of space. uunionsq
C Quantum Preliminaries
For Appendices D and E, we assume that the reader is familiar with basic concepts of
quantum information theory. We refer to [NC00] for an introduction and merely fix some
notation here.
C.1 Quantum Teleportation
An important example of a 2-qubit state is the EPR pair, which is given by |Φ〉AB =
(|0〉A|0〉B + |1〉A|1〉B)/
√
2 ∈ HA⊗HB = C2⊗C2 and has the following properties: if qubit
A is measured in the computational basis, then a uniformly random bit x ∈ {0, 1} is
observed and qubit B collapses to |x〉. Similarly, if qubit A is measured in the Hadamard
basis, then a uniformly random bit x ∈ {0, 1} is observed and qubit B collapses to H|x〉.
The goal of quantum teleportation is to transfer a quantum state from one location to
another by only communicating classical information. Teleportation requires pre-shared
entanglement among the two locations. To teleport a qubit Q in an arbitrary unknown
state |ψ〉Q from Alice to Bob, Alice performs a Bell-measurement on Q and her half of
an EPR pair, yielding a classical measurement outcome k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Instantaneously,
the other half of the corresponding EPR pair, which is held by Bob, turns into the state
σk|ψ〉, where σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3 denote the four Pauli-corrections {I, X, Z,XZ}, respectively.
The classical information k is then communicated to Bob who can recover the state |ψ〉
by performing σk on his EPR half.
D Separations between Quantum and Classical Garden-Hose
Complexity
D.1 Deterministic Setting
Using techniques from [BCW98], we show a separation between the garden-hose model
and the quantum garden-hose model in the deterministic setting for the function EQ′,
defined as:
EQ′(x, y) =
{
1 if ∆(x, y) = 0 ,
0 if ∆(x, y) = n/2 ,
where ∆(x, y) denotes the Hamming distance between two n-bit strings x and y. We show
that the zero-error quantum garden-hose complexity of EQ′ is logarithmic in the input
length.
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Theorem D.1. GHQ(EQ′) ∈ O(log n).
Proof. Alice and Bob start with the fully entangled quantum state of log n qubits, i.e. with
1√
n
∑n−1
i=0 |i〉|i〉. Counting indices of the input bits from 0 to n− 1, Alice gives a phase of
−1 to state |i〉 whenever xi = 0 and Bob does the same thing with his half when the bit
yi = 0, yielding the state
1√
n
n−1∑
i=0
(−1)xi+yi |i〉|i〉 .
After both Alice and Bob perform a Hadamard transformation on their qubits, we
obtain
1
n
√
n
∑
i
∑
a,b
(−1)xi+yi(−1)a·i(−1)b·i|a〉|b〉 .
So the probability pa,b of obtaining outcome a, b when measuring in the computational
basis is
pa,b =
1
n3
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
(−1)xi+yi+(a+b)·i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
If x = y, then pa,b = 0 wherever a 6= b. If ∆(x, y) = n/2, then pa,b = 0 wherever a = b.
It follows that EQ′(x, y) = EQ(a, b) — determining the equality of the n-bit strings
x and y is equivalent to computing the equality of the log(n)-bit strings a and b. The
garden-hose protocol for equality needs a number of pipes that is linear in the input size.
After the quantum steps above, Alice and Bob can use O(log n) water pipes to compute
EQ(a, b). uunionsq
We can also show that the deterministic classical garden-hose complexity has an
almost-linear lower bound.
Theorem D.2. GH (EQ′) ∈ Ω( nlogn)
Proof. Theorem 1.7 of [BCW98] shows that the zero-error classical communication com-
plexity of EQ′ is lower bounded by Ω(n). The statement then follows from Proposition 2.8.
uunionsq
D.2 Randomized Setting
The Noisy Perfect Matching problem (NPM) is a variant of the Boolean Hidden Matching
introduced in [GKK+07] where they prove an exponential gap between the classical one-
way communication complexity and the quantum one-way communication complexity of
NPM. We adapt the given quantum one-way protocol to our setting, showing that the
quantum garden-hose complexity is only logarithmic. This gives a separation between the
classical and quantum garden-hose complexity of a partial function in the randomized
setting.
The NPM problem is described as follows:10
Alice’s input: x ∈ {0, 1}2n.
10 For this example, we deviate from the earlier convention of giving two n-bit strings as input to the
players.
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Bob’s input: a perfect matching M on {1, . . . , 2n} and a string w ∈ {0, 1}n. The match-
ing M consists of n edges, e1 = (i1, j1), . . . , en = (in, jn).
Promise: ∃b ∈ {0, 1} such that ∆(M · x ⊕ bn, w) ≤ n/3, where ∆(·, ·) is the Hamming
distance and the k-th bit of the n-bit string M · x equals xik ⊕ xjk .
Function value: b.
Informally, the question asked is whether the parity on the edges of M , where the vertices
are entries of x, is close to the parities specified by w, or not.
Theorem D.3. GHQ(NPM) ∈ O(log n).
Proof. Alice and Bob use log(2n) EPR pairs as quantum state |ψ〉 = 1√
2n
∑2n−1
i=0 |i〉|i〉.
Alice inserts her input bits x = x0 . . . x2n−1 as phases of the shared superposition, yielding
the shared state
1√
2n
2n−1∑
i=0
(−1)xi |i〉A|i〉B .
Bob performs the following measurement: he uses projectors Pk = |ik〉〈ik|B + |jk〉〈jk|B
corresponding to the n edges. As they form a perfect matching, we have
∑n
k=1 Pk = I
and PkPk′ = δkk′Pk, so {Pk}k is a valid orthogonal measurement. Let us denote Bob’s
measurement outcome by `. Setting i := i` and j := j`, the post-measurement state is
(−1)xi |i〉A|i〉B + (−1)xj |j〉A|j〉B .
Alice then performs a Hadamard transform H⊗2n ⊗ I on her part of the state, resulting
in
2n−1∑
a=0
|a〉A
[
(−1)xi+a·i|i〉B + (−1)xj+a·j |j〉B
]
.
Alice measures her register in the computational basis and obtains outcome a. Bob per-
forms a Hadamard gate on basis states |i〉B and |j〉B, that is, Hi,j = 12(|i〉〈i|B + |i〉〈i|B +
|j〉〈j|B − |j〉〈j|B), resulting in the state
|a〉A
(
1
2
[
(−1)xi+a·i + (−1)xj+a·j] |i〉B
+
1
2
[
(−1)xi+a·i − (−1)xj+a·j] |j〉B) .
and measures in the computational basis. He gets outcome i if and only if xi⊕a·i = xj⊕a·j
which is equivalent to xi ⊕ xj = a · (i⊕ j). In case xi ⊕ xj 6= a · (i⊕ j), Bob gets outcome
j.
In the garden-hose game played after the measurements, Alice and Bob perform the
garden-hose protocol for the inner-product function described in [Spe11] with a and i⊕ j
as their respective inputs. The protocol can be easily adapted so that at the end of it, the
water will be in one particular pipe (known to Bob) on Bob’s side if a · (i⊕ j) = 0, let us
call this pipe 0-pipe. The water will be in another “1-pipe” (known to Bob) if a·(i⊕j) = 1.
Furthermore, Bob knows from his second measurement outcome if they are computing
xi⊕xj or xi⊕xj⊕1. In the first case, Bob looks at the `-th bit of w and leaves the 0-pipe
open if w` = 1 and routes the 1-pipe to Alice, and if w` = 0 he keeps the 1-pipe open
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and sends back the 0-pipe. This strategy computes the function value w` ⊕ xi ⊕ xj , with
` uniformly random in {1, . . . , n}. The promise guarantees that it gives the correct value
b with probability at least 23 . The second case (when Bob knows that a · (i⊕ j) 6= xi⊕xj)
is handled by the “inverse” strategy. uunionsq
Theorem D.4. GHε(NPM) ∈ Ω(
√
n
logn).
Proof. Combining the lower bound on the classical one-way communication complexity
from [GKK+07] of Ω(
√
n) with Proposition 2.19 gives the statement. uunionsq
E Lower Bounds on Quantum Resources for a Perfect Attack
We show that for a function that is injective for Alice or injective for Bob (according to
Definition 2.4), the dimension of the state the adversaries need to handle (including pos-
sible quantum communication between them) in order to attack protocol PVfqubit perfectly
has to be of order at least linear in the classical input size n. We start by showing two
lemmas. The actual bound is shown in Section E.3.
In the last subsection, we show that there exist functions for which perfect attacks on
PVfqubit requires the adversaries to handle a polynomial amount of qubits.
E.1 Localized Qubits
Assume we have two bipartite states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 with the property that |ψ0〉 allows
Alice to locally extract a qubit and |ψ1〉 allows Bob to locally extract the same qubit.
Intuitively, these two states have to be different.
More formally, we assume that both states consist of five registers R,A, A˜, B, B˜ where
registers R,A,B are one-qubit registers and A˜ and B˜ are arbitrary. We assume that there
exist local unitary transformations UAA˜ acting on registers AA˜ and VBB˜ acting on BB˜
such that11
UAA˜|ψ0〉RAA˜BB˜ = |β〉RA ⊗ |P 〉A˜BB˜ (1)
VBB˜|ψ1〉RAA˜BB˜ = |β〉RB ⊗ |Q〉AA˜B˜ , (2)
where |β〉RA := (|00〉RA+ |11〉)RA)/
√
2 denotes an EPR pair on registers RA and |P 〉A˜BB˜
and |Q〉AA˜B˜ are arbitrary pure states.
Lemma E.1. Let |ψ0〉, |ψ1〉 be states that fulfill (1) and (2). Then,∣∣ 〈ψ0|ψ1〉 ∣∣ ≤ 1/2 .
Proof. Multiplying both sides of (1) with U †
AA˜
and multiplying (2) with V †
BB˜
, we can
write ∣∣ 〈ψ0|ψ1〉 ∣∣ = ∣∣ 〈β|RA〈P |A˜BB˜ UAA˜ V †BB˜ |β〉RB|Q〉AA˜B˜ ∣∣
=
∣∣ 〈β|RA〈P ′|A˜BB˜|β〉RB|Q′〉AA˜B˜ ∣∣
=
∣∣ 〈P ′|A˜BB˜〈β|RA|β〉RB|Q′〉AA˜B˜ ∣∣ ,
11 We always assume that these transformations act as the identities on the registers we do not specify
explicitly.
20
where we used that UAA˜ and VBB˜ commute and defined |P ′〉A˜BB˜ := VBB˜|P 〉A˜BB˜ and
|Q′〉AA˜B˜ := UAA˜|Q〉AA˜B˜. The last equality is just rearranging terms that act on different
registers.
Note that writing out the partial inner product between |β〉RA and |β〉RB gives
〈β|RA|β〉RB = 1
2
(〈0|A|0〉B + 〈1|A|1〉B) ,
where the operator in the parenthesis “transfers” a qubit from register A to register B.
Hence, ∣∣ 〈ψ0|ψ1〉 ∣∣ = ∣∣ 〈P ′|A˜BB˜ 12(〈0|A|0〉B + 〈1|A|1〉B)|Q′〉AA˜B˜ ∣∣
=
1
2
· ∣∣ 〈P ′|A˜BB˜|Q′〉BA˜B˜ ∣∣
≤ 1
2
,
where the last step follows from the fact that the inner product between any two unit
vectors on the same registers can be at most 1. uunionsq
E.2 Squeezing Many Vectors in a Small Space
For the sake of completeness, we reproduce here an argument similar to [NC00, Section
4.5.4] about covering the state space of dimension d with patches of radius ε.
Lemma E.2. Let B be a set of 2n distinct unit vectors in a complex Hilbert space of
dimension d, with pairwise absolute inner product at most 1/2. Then, the dimension d
has to be in Ω(n).
Proof. For any two vectors |v〉, |w〉, we can rotate the space such that |v〉 = |0〉 and
|w〉 = cos θ|0〉 + sin θ|1〉 for two orthogonal vectors |0〉 and |1〉. The Euclidean distance
between |v〉 and |w〉 can be expressed as∣∣ |v〉 − |w〉 ∣∣ = |(1− cos θ)|0〉 − sin θ|1〉|
=
√
(1− cos θ)2 + sin2 θ
=
√
1− 2 cos θ + cos2 θ + sin2 θ
=
√
2
√
1− cos θ .
If |v〉 and |w〉 have absolute inner product at most 1/2, we have that | cos θ| ≤ 1/2 and
hence
∣∣ |v〉 − |w〉 ∣∣ ≥ 1. Therefore, the vectors in B have pairwise Euclidean distance at
least 1. The set of unit vectors |w〉 with Euclidean distance at most δ from |v〉 is called
patch of radius δ around |v〉. It follows that patches of radius 1/2 around every vector in
the set B do not overlap.
The space of all d-dimensional state vectors can be regarded as the real unit (2d− 1)-
sphere, because the vector has d complex amplitudes and hence 2d real degrees of freedom
with the restriction that the sum of the squared amplitudes is equal to 1. Notice that the
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Euclidean distance between complex vectors |v〉, |w〉 remains unchanged if we regard these
vectors as points of the real unit (2d− 1)-sphere.
The surface area of a patch of radius 1/2 near any vector is lower bounded by the
volume of a (2d− 2)-sphere of radius ε where ε is a constant slightly less than 1/2.12. We
use the formula Sk(r) = 2pi
(k+1)/2rk/Γ((k + 1)/2) for the surface area of a k-sphere of
radius r, and Vk(r) = 2pi
(k+1)/2rk+1/[(k+ 1) Γ((k+ 1)/2)] for the volume of a k-sphere of
radius r. The total surface area of all patches, which is at least 2n · V2d−2(ε), is not more
than the total surface of the whole sphere S2d−1(1). Inserting the formulas, we get
2n · 2pid− 12 ε
2d−1
(2d− 1) Γ(d− 12)
≤ 2pid 1
Γ(d)
Using the fact that
Γ(d− 1
2
)
Γ(d) ≤ 1d , we conclude that
2n ≤ √pi(2− 1
d
)ε−(2d−1) ≤ 2√piε−(2d−1) .
As ε < 1/2, we obtain that d has to be in Ω(n). uunionsq
E.3 The Lower Bound
We consider perfect attacks on protocol PVfqubit from Figure 2. We allow the players
one round of simultaneous quantum communication which we model as follows. Let
|ψ〉RAA˜ACBB˜BC be the pure state after Alice received the EPR half from the verifier.
The one-qubit register R holds the verifier’s half of the EPR-pair, the one-qubit register
A contains Alice’s other half of the EPR-pair, the register A˜ is Alice’s part of the pre-
shared entangled state and the register AC holds the qubits that will be communicated
to Bob. The registers BB˜BC belong to Bob where B holds one qubit and B˜ is Bob’s part
of the entangled state and the BC register will be sent to Alice. We denote by qA the
total number of qubits in registers A˜ and AC and by qB the total number of qubits in B˜
and BC . The overall state is thus a unit vector in a complex Hilbert space of dimension
d := 22+qA+1+qB .
In the first step of their attack, Alice performs a unitary transform Ux depending on
her classical input x on her registers AA˜AC . Similarly, Bob performs a unitary transform
V y depending on y on registers BB˜BC . After the application of these transforms, the
communication registers AC and BC and the classical inputs x and y are exchanged.
A final unitary transform (performed either by Alice or Bob) depending on both x, y
“unveils” the qubit either in Alice’s register A or in Bob’s register B.
Theorem E.3. Let f be injective for Bob. Assume that Alice and Bob perform a per-
fect attack on protocol PVfqubit. Then, the dimension d of the overall state (including the
quantum communication) is in Ω(n).
Proof. We assume that the player’s actions are unitary transforms as described before
the theorem.
12 The patch is a “bent” version of this volume.
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We investigate the set B of overall states after Bob performed his operation, but before
Alice acts on the state. These states depend on Bob’s input y ∈ {0, 1}n,
B :=
{
V y
BB˜BC
|ψ〉RAA˜ACBB˜BC : y ∈ {0, 1}
n
}
.
We claim that for any two different n-bit strings y 6= y′, the corresponding two vectors
V y|ψ〉 and V y′ |ψ〉 in B have an absolute inner product of at most 1/2.
Due to the injectivity of f , there exists an input x for Alice such that f(x, y) 6=
f(x, y′). Applying Alice’s unitary transform Ux to both vectors does not change their
inner product, i.e.
|〈ψ|(V y)†V y′ |ψ〉| = |〈ψ|(V y)†(Ux)†UxV y′ |ψ〉| .
As f(x, y) 6= f(x, y′), the qubit has to end up on different sides. Formally, there exist
unitary transforms KAA˜BC and LBB˜AC that “unveil” the qubit in register A or B respec-
tively. Hence, we can apply Lemma E.1 to prove the claim that the two vectors V y|ψ〉
and V y
′ |ψ〉 have an absolute inner product of at most 1/2. In particular, all of the vectors
in B are distinct. Applying Lemma E.2 yields the theorem. uunionsq
E.4 Functions For Which Perfect Attacks Need a Large Space
Using similar arguments as above, we can show the existence of functions for which perfect
attacks require polynomially many qubits.
Theorem E.4. For any starting state |ψ〉 of dimension d, there exists a Boolean function
on inputs x, y ∈ {0, 1}n such that any perfect attack on PVfqubit requires d to be exponential
in n.
We believe that the statement with the reversed order of quantifiers is true as well
(but our current proof does not suffice for this purpose), so that we can guarantee the
existence of one particular function (independent of the starting state) for which perfect
attacks require large states.
Proof (sketch). We consider covering the sphere with K patches of vectors whose pairwise
absolute inner product is larger than
√
3
2 (which corresponds to an Euclidean distance of
ε =
√
2
√
1 +
√
3/2 ≈ 0.52). This partitioning also induces a partitioning on all possible
unitary operations of Alice and Bob. We say that two actions A and A′ are in the same
patch if they take the starting state |ψ〉 to the same patch. In other words, if two actions
are in the same patch then ∣∣〈ψ|A′†A|ψ〉∣∣ ≥ √3
2
.
Claim. Given two actions of Alice A,A′ coming from the same patch i, and two actions of
Bob B,B′ coming from the same patch j, the inner product between BA|ψ〉 and B′A′|ψ〉
has magnitude at least 12 .
Proof (of the claim). Since Alice and Bob act on different parts of the state, their actions
commute. Write |ψA〉 := A′†A|ψ〉 and |ψB〉 := B†B′|ψ〉. Then the inner product can be
written as
〈ψ|A′†B′†BA|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|B′†BA′†A|ψ〉 = 〈ψB|ψA〉
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Note that ∣∣〈ψ|ψA〉∣∣ = ∣∣〈ψ|A′†A|ψ〉∣∣ ≥ √3
2
,
so the angle θ between |ψA〉 and |ψ〉 is at most arccos
√
3
2 =
pi
6 . The same holds for the
angle between |ψB〉 and |ψ〉. We can upper bound the total angle between |ψA〉 and |ψB〉
by the sum of these angles, giving a total angle of at most pi3 . This corresponds to a lower
bound on the inner product of cos pi3 =
1
2 . uunionsq
So there exists no pair of combined actions AB and A′B′, with A and A′ in patch
i and B and B′ in patch j, such that the qubit ends up on Alice’s side for AB and on
Bob’s side for A′B′. Therefore, the combination of i and j completely determines the
destination of the qubit and hence the output of the function. If K denotes the number of
patches, then there are K2
n
possible strategies for Alice and K2
n
possible strategies for
Bob. Hence, the number of combined strategies (possibly resulting in different functions)
is at most K2·2n .
It is shown in [NC00, Section 4.5.4] that we need at least K = Ω( 1
εd−1 ) patches. Using
the same counting argument as in Proposition 2.9, we have that
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2n ≥ Ω
(
1
ε(d−1)2·2n
)
,
from which follows that for some function, d has to be exponential in n. uunionsq
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